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To Get A Diploma or to Get Welfare:
Duncan's Dilemma

County of Madera v. Carleson' denies to a father, who is under
the age of eighteen and not exempt from the California compulsory
continuation education laws, the right to qualify his family for Aid
to Families with Dependent Children-Unemployed Parents Program (AFDC-U), particularly if he has ever held a summer or other
part-time job. The California Court of Appeals, Fifth District,
held that a seventeen year old high school senior who was enrolled
in a vocationally oriented high school program, was not in training
as a result of unemployment, as required by the Welfare and Institutions Code Section 11201,2 and that since he had held summer
jobs, his continued schooling was not essential to his future selfsupport.3
Steve Duncan (hereinafter, Duncan) was seventeen, married, and
about to become a father when he applied for AFDC-U. He was
scheduled to be graduated from Chowchilla High School in seven
months; his classes were designed to prepare him for a career in
carpentry. While on vacation from school and on weekends, Duncan
had held part-time jobs as a farm laborer and had had some limited
experience as a service station attendant. Duncan's application
for aid for his family was denied, whereupon he petitioned the Department of Social Welfare for a hearing. 4 The hearing officer
made written findings and conclusions, on the basis of which Duncan's petition was denied. Those findings found to be determinative
were:
(1) Claimant has worked part time for the past six years in farm
labor and has some experience as a service station attendant.
(2) Claimant's attendance at high school results from voluntary
choice to attend school rather than seek full-time employment at
the present time. Claimant's high school courses can enable him
to learn skills which would assist him to become a carpenter.
(3) Claimant's work experience establishes that he is capable of
engaging in gainful occupations other than carpentry.
1. 32 Cal. App. 3d 764, 108 Cal. Rptr. 515 (June 4, 1973).
§ 11201(a) (West 1972).
3. Id.
2. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
4. Pursuant to

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§

10950-10958 (West 1972).

(4) Claimant is neither available for nor seeking full-time employment and is in full-time, regular attendance at high school. 5
Following the hearing officer's denial, the Director of the Department of Social Welfare rendered an "Alternate Decision",,
(based on the same findings and conclusions).
The Director reversed the county and the hearing officer and ordered Duncan's
petition to be granted. The county then petitioned the superior
court for review of the "Alternate Decision" of the Director, contending that the decision was contrary to the law. The judgment
of the superior court set aside the Director's "Alternate Decision,"
and denied aid to Duncan. Since the evidence compiled by the
hearing officer did support the findings of fact, the issue at the
appellate level was whether or not Duncan was legally entitled to
AFDC-U payments, i.e. was an "unemployed parent" as defined in
the Welfare and Institutions Code Section 11201.
In making its determination, the appellate court was faced with
the task of deciding the interrelationship of several provisions of
the Welfare and Institutions Code. For clarity, these are quoted
in pertinent parts here. The provisions are given as they were at
the time of Duncan's application. Section 10001, subdivision (b)
provides:
The purpose of the public social services for which state grantsin-aid are made to counties are: . . . (b) To provide timely
and appropriate services to assist individuals develop or use
whatever capacity they can maintain or achieve for self-care or
self-support.7
Section 11000 provides:
The provisions of law relating to a public assistance program
shall be liberally construed
to effect the stated objects and pur8
poses of the program.
Section 11201 provides:
For the purposes of this chapter, "unemployed parent" means a
natural parent, adoptive parent, or stepparent with whom the
child is living, and who:
(a) Is not working but is available for and seeking employment or, as a result of unemployment, has been accepted for or is
participating in a training project essential to future self-support,
or
(b) Is employed only part-time as determined in accordance
with such standards as may be developed by the department in
5. County of Madera v. Carleson, 32 Cal. App. 3d 764, 768, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 515, 518 (1973).
6. Pursuant to CAL. WELF.& INST. CODE § 10959 (West 1972).

7.

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE

8. Id.

(West 1972).
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its rules and regulations, which standards shall be consistent with
federal law and regulations governing the payment of federal
funds to this state under the Social Security Act and consistent
with other provisions of this chapter. 9
Section 11205 provides:
It is the object and purpose of this chapter to provide aid for
children whose dependency is caused by circumstances defined in
Sections 11250 ...
Those engaged in the administration of aid under this chapter
are responsible to the community for its effective, humane, and
economical administration.
... The employment and self-maintenance of parents of needy
children shall be encouraged to the maximum extent and that this
chapter shall be administered in such a way that needy children
and their parents will be encouraged and inspired to assist in
their own maintenance. The State Department of Social Welfare
and the State Department of Health shall take all steps necessary
to implement this section. 10
Section 11250 provides:
Aid, services, or both, shall be granted under the provisions of
this chapter, and subject to the regulations of the department, to
families with related children under the age of 18 years, except as
provided in Section 11253, in need thereof because they have been
deprived of parental support or care due to: ...
(c) the unemployment of a parent or parents."
It should here be noted that Section 11253, referred to above, deals
with continuation of payments for children, aged 16-21 who are
still in school.
Duncan's basic contentions regarding these statutes were that,
in order to effect the purpose of the public social service program
embodied in AFDC, a liberal construction must be given to the definition of "unemployed parent" so that he will fall within the definition and be eligible for aid. The appellate court, however, found
that Section 10001, the general purpose provision, was qualified by
Section 11201, stating, "It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that
the specific provisions of a statute control the general provisions
[Citations omitted] .,"12The court also negated the applicability of
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. This statute was amended, effective July 1, 1973, to delete the
words "service or both" after the introductory word "Aid."
12. County of Madera v. Carleson, 32 Cal. App. 3d 764, 770, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 515, 520 (1973).

Sections 11205 and 11250 by finding that Section 11201 expressly
defines the qualifications of "unemployed parent" as required by
Section 11250 and that Section 11205 does not apply until the applicant meets the eligibility requirements set out in Section 11250.
As to Section 11000, the court found that since the statute in question, Section 11201, was "plain, clear, and unambiguous on its
face, ' 13 there was no necessity for construction at all:
We find nothing in the legislative history or on the face of the

statute that would justify ignoring the plain meaning of the
language used in Section 11201. The court cannot ignore the
plain words of the statute unless it appears the words used were,
beyond question, contrary to what was intended by the Legislature.
[Citations omitted]

14

Section 11201 may be plain, clear, and unambiguous on its face,
but it seems unjust that it should be applied to Duncan or any
other father under eighteen and subject to California's compulsory
education laws. The issue of the conflict between Section 11201 and
the compulsory education laws was not raised by any party to this
case. However, in order for Duncan to qualify under Section 11201,
he would have to be in violation of Education Code Sections 12551,
12553, and 12601. Education Code Section 12551 requires all students between the ages of sixteen and eighteen, who are not enrolled in full-time school, to attend continuation education, unless
they are exempt. Students who are employed must attend a minimum of four hours per week; 15 unemployed students fall under
Education Code Section 12553 which requires a minimum attendance
of three hours per day. 16 At the time of this case, an exempt student was defined in Education Code Section 12601 as one, who because of physical or mental handicaps, would be unable to benefit
in any substantial way from such a program.1 7 Whereas this latter
section was repealed and superseded in 1972, and there is now one
exemption that might possibly be stretched to include Duncan, the
statute in effect at the time clearly did not pertain to him."' All high
13. Id. at 768, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
14. Id.
15. CAL. ED. CODE (West 1969).

16. Id.
17. Id.

18. CAL. ED. CODE
exemption statute:

§

12601 was repealed and superceded by the following

"There are exempted from compulsory attendance in continuation education classes as otherwise required by Sections 12551 and 12553, persons
who:
(a) Have been graduated from a high school maintaining a four-year
course above the eighth grade of the elementary schools, or who have had

an equal amount of education in a private school or by private tuition.
(b) Are in attendance upon a public or private full-time day school, or
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school districts except those with less than 100 seniors are required to have continuation education classes,1" so it would seem
that Duncan would be required to attend school at least part time.
Continuation classes were held during the day and, until Assembly
Bill 1679 was signed into law at the end of the 1973 legislative session, adult school classes, usually given at night, were not an acceptable substitute.
By requiring Duncan to leave school prior to graduation and
prior to his eighteenth birthday in order to be eligible for AFDC,
the court required him to be in violation of the compulsory education statutes of the State of California. Welfare and Institutions
Code Section 11201, as applied to Duncan, also contravenes Opinion Number 62-88 of the Attorney General's Opinions, April 24,
1962.20 That opinion dealt with the question of whether or not
a governing board of a high school district could adopt policies
that excluded married students from regular daytime high school
attendance. Basing his opinion on Article IX, Section 5 of the
California Constitution, Attorney General Stanley Mosk concluded
that this could not be done. In the opinion, the Attorney General
quoted the following:
Not only does society have a right to require full-time attendance
of the child in a public school or a private school but these provi-

sions have been interpreted as granting to the qualified child the
21
correlative right to attend full-time school. [Citations omitted]
satisfactory part-time classes maintained by other agencies.
(c) Are disqualified for attendance upon these classes because of their
physical or mental condition, or because of personal services that must be
rendered to their dependents. (Emphasis added).
(d) Are satisfactorily attending a regional occupational program or center as provided in Section 5952.
(e) Have successfully demonstrated proficiency equal to or greater than
standards as established by the Department of Education pursuant to Section 12603, and have verified approval submitted by their parent or guardian."

The italicized portion of this statute might be stretched to apply to
Duncan, but the plain meaning of the words is that such person would
have to stay at home; it is probably designed for young mothers.
19. CAL. ED. CODE § 5952 (West 1969).
20.

39 Op. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 256 (1962).

21. 39 OP. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 149, 150 (1962). (Incorporated from Opinion No. 61-237, Mar. 9, 1962, dealing with whether or not an elementary
school child enrolled in a private school must be allowed to attend some
public school classes, if desired).

By incorporating this quote into Opinion Number 62-88, it would
seem that in the opinion of the Attorney General, a high school
aged student also has the right to attend school full-time and, by
virtue of this opinion, marriage is not a valid reason for disqualifying him. The Education Code gives as valid reasons for exclusion
"filthy or vicious habits," "contagious or infectious diseases," 22 or
"physical or mental disability such as to cause his attendance to be
inimical to the welfare of other students. '23 Other grounds for
exclusion include incorrigible misconduct, vulgarity, abuse of teachers, and other such behavior patterns considered to be detrimental
to the other students, the teachers, and the smooth functioning of
the school. 24 There is no evidence that these bases for exclusion
would apply to Duncan.
By giving Duncan the option of either finishing high school or
qualifying for AFDC-U, the instant decision is effectively denying Duncan his right to finish high school because he is married.
Had Duncan not married the soon-to-be mother of his baby, he
would have had no problem finishing high school. (Not only could
the mother have qualified for aid, but she also would have been
allowed either to go to school or stay home until the child reached
the age of six.) 25 True, he might have had to make child support
payments, but this could be done with a part-time job, and the decision in the instant case requires that he be available for full-time
employment. If marriage is not an acceptable exclusion for a
school district to make, it should not become more acceptable because made by the court, the county, or the Department of Social
Welfare.
One would have to conclude that if the court is carrying out legislative intent by applying Welfare and Institutions Code Section
11201 to Duncan, the Legislature has established a situation whereby in order for Duncan to qualify for AFDC-U, he must give up his
right to attend school full time, and, in the process, violate the
provisions of the Education Code that require him to attend. Article IX, Section 1, of the California Constitution provides:
A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential
to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the
22. CAL. ED. CODE

§

10552 (West 1969).

23. Id. § 10553.
24. Id. § 10602.
25. CAL. STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE MANUAL § 41-407. Included among those exempted from having to be available for and seeking
employment are: children under sixteen, full-time students under twentyone (recipients, not qualifiers), those over sixty-five, those who are in-

capacitated, and mothers or caretakers of children under six.
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Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion
of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.

In light of this, the intent of the Legislature as seen by the court
contravenes the Constitution. Public policy would undoubtedly
be to discourage such young people from having children, but it
would not be to discourage them from getting married if children
were conceived. It is much more likely that in drafting Welfare
and Institutions Code Section 11201, the Legislature simply neglected to realize that the statute would, by its terms, make it impossible for fathers under the age of eighteen to qualify. This is an
oversight that should be corrected.
There are two possibilities that now exist for applying the statute
to someone in Duncan's position. The first is to disregard the "as
a result of unemployment" language when the applicant falls under
the compulsory education laws. This would essentially mean either
that the Legislature would amend the statute to codify this exception or that judicial interpretation would make the exception.
This could easily be accomplished by the recognition that legislative intent was not served by failure to construe Welfare and Institutions Code Section 11201, thereby making Section 11000 applicable. Since it should be apparent that the Legislature, as a matter
of public policy, did not intend to exclude fathers under the age of
eighteen from AFDC, the court should liberally construe the statute so as to remove the language, "as a result of unemployment,"
as a condition precedent to participation in a training program for
those AFDC applicant fathers subject to the compulsory education
laws. The court in County of Madera v. Carleson26 seemed to be
concerned that allowing Duncan to qualify would make anyone who
voluntarily quit a job to return to school eligible for welfare. Limiting the exception to those who fall under the compulsory education laws would solve this problem.
The second possibility would be to make use of California Department of Social Welfare Manual Sections 41-440.21 and 41-440.22
which say that AFDC cannot be denied or discontinued if the person
is assigned to training under the Work Incentive Program (WIN)
or if the person is participatingin a program approved by the Director of the State Department of Social Welfare or a WIN equiva26. 32 Cal. App. 3d 764, 770, 108 Cal. Rptr. 515, 520 (1973).

lent under the Economic Opportunity Act, Title I, Elementary and
Secondary School Act. (Emphasis added) .27 The Director could
simply find that continuation of high school is an approved program so that a person in Duncan's position could not be denied
AFDC. This was probably the motivation for the Director's "Alternate Decision," but since he did not appear in court, this is purely
a matter of conjecture.
Even if provision were made to ignore the "as a result of unemployment" language, there is another problem in applying Welfare
and Institutions Code Section 11201 to Duncan. This problem needs
clarifying in order to apply the statute to anyone. "Self-support"
has never been judicially defined and needs to be if the eligibility
of one in a training program is to be predicated on that training
being "essential to his future self-support. '28 The court and the
hearing officer appeared to give great weight to the fact that Duncan had had some job experience, yet a definition of self-support
and a determination of what would be essential to it were ignored.
Self-support is defined as "the act or capacity for supporting
oneself financially without the help of others. '29 That would seem
to mean that the training would make one able to earn at least as
much as he could on AFDC, including medical benefits and food
stamps. The California Department of Social Welfare Manual
Section 44-111.125 defines self-support as an "earning pattern over
a reasonable period of time [that] demonstrates average earnings
which are sufficient for self-support and which are likely to continue." (Emphasis added). Duncan's summer work experiences as
a farm laborer and service station attendant do not seem to qualify
as a reasonable period of time nor do they show any evidence of
continuing. People who employ students for summer jobs are not
necessarily interested in hiring them as full-time employees and
frequently are unable to do so. Although no income data or permanent job prospect information was given in the findings, it is
questionable that projections from Duncan's summer employment
would lead to a conclusion that Duncan was able to maintain a level
of self-support such as that described above. This is particularly
true in light of the well-known fact that unemployment rates for
recent high school drop-outs are nearly twice as high as the rates
for those who have completed high school. The facts state that
Duncan had been doing farm labor during summer vacations for
27. Cal. Dep't of Soc. Welf. Manual §§ 41-440.21 and 41-440.22.
28.
29.

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §11201 (West 1972).
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

(1969-70 ed.).
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six years, which would mean he had been so employed since he was
eleven. Whatever he was doing could not require any degree of
skill. The 1970 Census data for Madera County gives $4,252 as the
median farm labor income,30 and one would- assume that unskilled
farm laborers would be concentrated in the 50% falling below that
income. Even taking the median figure as Duncan's potential annual income, it is questionable that this amount would be defined as "self-support." The Occupational Outlook Handbook
gives no income figures at all for farm labor because they predict
a decreasing employment opportunity in that field, based on a decline nationally from 9.9 million workers in 1950 to 4.5 million in
1970; the predicted decrease is to 3.3-3.5 million by 1980.,1 Apparently, the Department of Labor does not feel that farm labor is a
field a young person should plan to enter because the need for future workers is so uncertain, and the trend is downward.
Predicating Duncan's capability for self-support on his limited
service station attendant experience is equally tenuous. Once
again, there has not been a reasonable period of time in which to
judge this capability, and the likelihood of his full-time employment ever starting, let alone continuing, is not shown by the evidence. Chowchilla is by-passed by California Highway 99, one of
the major Los Angeles-San Francisco transportation arteries and
is not a major population center, so it would not be likely that
there would be a large number of service stations. To predicate
denial of aid for Duncan on the possibility that he could be employed as a full-time service station attendant and, thus, need not
complete his high school education is speculative, and without further data, does not support the decision of the court. Furthermore, Occupational Outlook Hankbook gives a range for service
station attendants of $1.80/hour to $2.91/hour, with the low figure
being more prevalent in small towns and rural areas. 3

2

It further

states that in those types of areas, a work week of less than forty
hours is not unusual. Even assuming that Duncan would be able
to secure such a job and could work a forty hour week for fiftytwo weeks per year, his annual income at the $1.80 rate would be
30. U.S.

BUREAU

OF THE CENSUS,

DEP'T OF COMMERCE,

AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, CALIFORNIA,

31.

U.S.

BUREAU OF LABOR

OUTLOOK HANDBOOK

32. Id. at 547.

STATISTICS,

(1972-73) at 579.

GENERAL SOCIAL

1970, Table 122 at 1049.

DEP'T OF LABOR,

OCCUPATIONAL

only $3,744. Once again, it is questionable that this would be considered "self-support." In the case under consideration, the court
seems to be equating self-support with any income-producing occupation or activity. However, if one refers back to Welfare and Institutions Code Section 11201, subsection (b), he will note that one
who works part time can fall within the definition of "unemployed
parent."
There clearly needs to be a legislative or judicial definition of
"self-support" if Section 11201 is not to be applied arbitrarily. One
approach is that suggested above. Others might be the minimum
wage or the Department of Labor statistics on what constitutes an
adequate living wage for a family in a given geographic area. It
would seem that any realistic standard employed by the court would
make it possible to consistently determine whether or not continuation of or assignment to a training program is essential to one's future self-support. At the present time, as emphasized by Duncan's
situation, that simply is not possible.
Had Duncan dropped out of school because of the denial of AFDC
benefits, he would have been forced to give up a training program
that was, in fact, essential to his being able to earn an adequate
income for his family. 33 To become a carpentry apprentice, one
must have reached the age of seventeen and be either a high school
graduate or pass the high school general education equivalency
test.3 4 Duncan may have been able to do the latter, but there is
no evidence on which to base a conclusion that he could have done
so. It would appear that the court decision would require him to
enter a field other than carpentry. The median income for skilled
labor in Madera County in 1970 was $7,380.35 Carpentry is one of
the higher paying skilled occupations, so Duncan's earning potential would probably have been in the upper 50%. Occupational
Outlook Handbook gives a national range for carpentry from
$4.45/hour to $8.10/hour, with the national average being $6.42/
hour.3 6 Taking the low figure at a forty hour week fifty-two weeks
a year, Duncan could earn an annual income of $9,256.
The only conclusion that can be reached is that if Duncan had
opted for AFDC payments rather than finishing high school, he
33. County of Madera v. Carleson, 32 Cal. App. 3d 764, 767, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 515, 518 (1973), n.3: All hearings were held subsequent to Duncan's
graduation from high school.
34. Information received from the apprenticeship secretary, Carpenter's Council of Orange County. This is standard throughout the state.
35.

GENERAL

SOCIAL

AND

ECONOMIC

CHARACTERISTS,

CALIFORNIA,

supra, note 32.
36.

OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK,

supra, note 33, at 384.

1970,
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would have done so on the basis of a statute that was inapplicable to him, was applied arbitrarily, was in contravention of his
right to attend school, was violative of the compulsory continuation
education laws, was in opposition to the legislative intent of both
the compulsory education laws and the public social service laws,
and was probably unconstitutional under Article IX, Section 1 of
the California Constitution. In addition, as a trade-off for seven
month's welfare payments, the court would have forced Duncan to
forego an occupation from which he clearly would have been selfsupporting to the extent that he would not need to apply for AFDC
again.
If the above are not enough reasons for amending or construing
Welfare and Institutions Code Section 11201 so as to allow one in
Duncan's position to qualify, there is a serious Equal Protection
issue raised by the application of the statute to such persons. In
May, 1973, The Supreme Court of the United States handed down
its decision in Frontiero v. Richardson.3 7 In a split decision, four
Justices held that classifications based on sex are inherently suspect and must be subjected to strict scrutiny; one Justice concurred;
two Justices concurred in the judgment but not in making sex
a suspect classification, and one Justice dissented. This case dealt
with a married female military officer's right to claim her husband
as a dependent even if he was not, in fact, dependent upon her for
more than half his support. Male military personnel were able to
get dependent's benefits simply by showing they were married.
In discussing the Government's admission that such scheme was
designed for administrative efficiency, the court said, quoting partly
from Reed v. Reed,38

"

.

. . any statutory scheme which draws a

sharp line between the sexes solely for the purpose of administrative convenience, necessarily commands 'dissimilar treatment for
men and women who are ...

similarly situated,' and therefore in-

volves the 'very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by
the [Constitution].' ",39
Applying strict scrutiny to a classification requires determining
not only if the classification has a rational basis, if the classification
bears a reasonable relationship to a proper governmental purpose,
37. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
38. 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
39. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973).

and if all persons in the class are treated equally, but also if the
classification promotes some compelling state interest. 40 Welfare
and Institutions Code Section 11201 quite possibly would not withstand such strict scrutiny. It has a rational basis in setting eligibility requirements for benefits under AFDC,. clearly a proper governmental purpose. However, not all persons are treated equally,
and the difference in treatment is based not only on age and opportunity to qualify but also on sex. The language in the statute refers to "parents," yet the mother of a child under six years of age
need not meet these criteria in order to be eligible. 41 Indeed, if
Duncan had not married the mother of his soon-to-be child, she
could be eligible for AFDC without having to drop out of high
school. There would be no requirement for her to be available for
and seeking employment. Mothers and fathers are both parents,
yet different standards are used to determine their eligibility.
This difference in treatment is undoubtedly based on the age-old
feeling and tradition that mothers should be home with their
young children, yet the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics
reported in 1971 that 41.5% of all married women were in the labor
force. 42 This statistic, coupled with the modern political concern
for an increase in adequate day care centers for the pre-school
children of working mothers, would lead to the conclusion that this
feeling is no longer coincidental with reality; the tradition has
broken down. Therefore, continued adherence to it could only be
for administrative efficiency or the result of inertia.
Welfare and Institutions Code Section 11201 also treats fathers
under eighteen differently from those over eighteen. It denies
them eligibility unless they violate the compulsory continuation
education laws and give up their right to attend high school. The
State would be hard-pressed to find a compelling state interest in
forcing minor males out of high school in order for them to qualify
for welfare. Indeed, an AFDC recipient minor of either sex-as
opposed to one attempting to qualify his family-is specifically
allowed to stay in school until he or she is twenty-one, without
having to register for employment, and payments made to the family for the child continue. 43 This would seem to indicate that the
State feels it extremely important for such minors to remain in
school, even through college, so that they will receive the kind of
career training to enable them to be self-supporting. If this is im40. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
41. CAL. DEP'T OF Soc. WELF. MANUAL § 41-407.
42. See n.23, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689-90 (1973).
43. CAL. DEP'T OF SOC. WELF. MANUAL § 41-407.
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portant for a single student, it should be all the more important
for one who already has a family.
It would seem that although Welfare and Institutions Code Section 11201 is not discriminatory on its face, its application is such
that it discriminates on the basis of sex and age. 44 Since sex discrimination appears now to have been held a suspect classification,
subject to strict scrutiny, Welfare and Institutions Code Section
11201, as applied, would have to be shown to serve a compelling
state interest in making fathers, eighteen and under, ineligible to
qualify their families for AFDC without dropping out of school.
To show a compelling state interest under these circumstances
would not be possible in light of the strong interest in education
evinced by the California Constitution and the education statutes.
Welfare and Institutions Code Section 11201 must be found to be a
denial of Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and,
as such, unconstitutional.
Steve Duncan should not have had his dilemma, and the Legislature and the courts of California should not have one now. Welfare and Institutions Code Section 11201 must be changed.

by NINA E. WEST

44. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

